10th Narrow Gauge Railways International Meeting

6, 7 and 8th October, 2000 - P'tit train de la Haute Somme (F)

SAFETY AND RULES

Leighton Buzzard Railway

Early days

We have all had, at some time or another, the train set that was the beginning of our interest in railways. Cast your mind back to the simple layout and the times when, for one reason or another, a wagon or coach de-railed. What happened next? Well, that favourite friend of the modelling community ‘the big hand from the sky’ - usually very evident at exhibitions – would intervene, set things to rights and one was then able to continue playing….But, should we be playing when we are ‘modelling’ in 1:1 scale ? What happens when, for the sheer thrill of seeing two trains moving at once, one of them is out of sight ? How do you know where the second train is ? What if something has gone wrong ?

Consider this: there are one or more passing loops and Train A has priority. An instruction is issued that, in the event of Train B meeting Train A coming towards it, Train B shall reverse until the passing loop is reached, set back into it and wait for Train A to pass. But who is responsible for changing the points? Whose responsibility is it to change them back to allow Train B to proceed? Is it the loco’s driver or the fireman/second man or is it the guard who has to do it?

These questions are relatively easily answered if the group operating the trains are doing so for their own pleasure, ie, if members of the general public are not being carried. Why is it different when the public are travelling ? To answer this question, we need to go back to the beginning – a short journey down the mainline of railway history. This journey will, of necessity, be in the United Kingdom but do not be alarmed – for much of what will be recounted will have happened in continental Europe to a lesser or greater extent.

 

The historical perspective

The early 18th Century was a time when a strict social hierarchy was in evidence. The nobility, the landed gentry and the peasants all recognised their respective positions in a largely agricultural, rural Society. Rail-ways with hand pushed wagons, later to be horse-drawn, had begun appearing in and around mines and quarries. Experiments with steam saw Trevithick’s locomotive operating at Coalbrookdale Iron Works in 1803. In 1812, Matthew Murray’s loco started work on the Middleton Railway, Leeds – the first in the UK to be authorised by Act of Parliament. And passenger railways ? The Liverpool to Manchester Railway, scene of the Rainhill trials in 1829, formally opened in 1830 with passengers being carried from 1833.

In the intervening 167 years since 1833, railway history is littered by a fascinating amalgam of incident, accident, improvement and development. We shall review some of these in the context of safety and railway operation.

During 1840, George Stephenson – perhaps the most famous name in the history of railways – who had been appointed to construct the Stockton and Darlington Railway, wrote to the President of the Board of Trade (a UK Government Ministry) strongly

recommending that an independent inspection of new railway infrastructure was needed. The President agreed. But where were such people to be found ? Who had any experience of major earthworks and the movement of people and goods on land ?

 

Enter the Army

The answer was – the Army – particularly, the Royal Corps of Engineers.

This was the beginning of the involvement of military personnel whose training, discipline and experience could be focused on this new form of transport. They were required to inspect, report and, if satisfied with their inspection, to approve the new works. Without the approval, passenger operation could not begin. Interestingly, in those early days, they had no legal responsibility to investigate accidents but, in 1840, an accident, where six people were killed on the Hull & Selby Railway, was the first to be investigated by an inspecting officer from the Royal Engineers, seconded to the Board of Trade.

 

Rules – what Rules ?

The first conference of railway managers was held in Birmingham during 1841 to draw up a Code of Rules for Operation and Signalling. By 1842, this body were known as the ‘Railway Clearing House’ whose main purpose was to settle rates of charges for through traffic, both freight and passenger, over the different British railway companies' systems

The development of operating rules was tempered by the frequency of accidents and the ingenuity of railway engineers in inventing equipment that would, hopefully, make travelling on railways a safer experience. In spite of the ingenuity shown, the actual introduction of these new inventions was painfully slow over the entire railway system. The most common excuse being the capital cost of so doing and the adverse effects it would have on the profitability of individual railway companies.

 

Signalling and brakes

During the 1830’s, railway traffic was regulated on a time interval basis. Disc and crossbar signals appeared on the Great Western Railway in 1840. Semaphore signals were introduced on the Greenwich Railway, in 1841. Rudimentary interlocking arrived in 1843. Ten years later, in 1853, staff working on single lines was designed to prevent two trains being in the same section at the same time

Patented interlocking of signals came in 1856 and three years later, in 1859, modern interlocking – where the movement of one lever must be completed before the second lever can be moved. This was followed, in the late 1860’s, by the facing point lock and locking bar – to prevent points being changed while a train was passing over them. Interlocking ensures that the points are locked before the appropriate signal can be cleared. The points cannot be changed until the signal is restored to danger.

 

Runaways

In 1858, near Wolverhampton, part of a heavy passenger train broke away and ran back into the path of a following passenger train – 14 passengers were killed. Two years later, in 1860, a similar accident occurred at Helmshore, Lancashire, in which 11 passengers died. These two accidents led to experiments with continuous brakes.

Whilst a continuous, mechanical brake had been patented in 1852, it was 21 years later before George Westinghouse patented his continuous air brake in 1873. The non-automatic vacuum brake was installed on the North Eastern Railway in 1874 with Gresham’s automatic continuous vacuum brake arriving in 1878.

In 1874, there was a head-on collision on a single line of the Great Eastern Railway in which 25 passengers were killed which led to experiments in better control by combining the physical staff with electricity. The result, in 1878 was the invention of the electric key (tablet) token for single line working.

 

Inspection and the Inspectorate

During the late 19th Century, it was recognised that a more formal body of Inspectors was needed. Again, the Government turned to the Army engineers drawing from their ranks the personnel that would become Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate. The early training of officers in railway operations was provided by the London, Chatham and Dover Railway – hardly surprising since the Corps of Royal Engineers was based at Chatham. One suspects they had plenty of opportunities to practise their inspection techniques since the ‘nick-name’ of that particular railway was the "Lam’em, Smash’em and Over"!

The British Army itself recognised the importance of movement of troops and equipment by rail – not only in the United Kingdom – but also, if their field of operations was overseas, in continental Europe and the far-flung outposts of the British Empire. This led to the creation by the Army, in 1880, of their railway at Longmoor to give training to their personnel in how to create, maintain, repair and operate railway systems both in times of peace as well as war. Interestingly, the thrust of military discipline with its strict adherence to Rules - at all times – was to provide the leavening of railway operation among civilian operators.

 

The Force of Law

In 1871, the UK Government passed the Regulation of Railways Act. It required all train accidents on passenger railways to be reported to the Minister of Transport. The Minister was empowered to order an enquiry into any reported accident – step forward the Railway Inspectors – who would carry out an investigation and then publish their reports.

It was yet another accident that drove further legislation which, of itself, was to be of great significance in safe railway operation. In 1889 at Armagh, Ireland, the rear half of a heavily over-loaded passenger excursion train – which had failed on a gradient

and had been divided – ran back and collided with a following passenger train. In all, 80 passengers were killed. The legislation was the Regulation of Railways Act 1889 which gave the Board of Trade the power to order 1) the inter-locking of points and signals 2) absolute block working on passenger lines (only one train in section at one time) and 3) automatic continuous brakes on passenger trains. These became known amongst railwaymen as "Lock, Block and Brake". All three of these were to be introduced, on all passenger railways, by 1890.

 

Safety of employees on railways

From the time of the 1871 Regulation of Railways Act, it was to be another thirty years before appropriate legislation was introduced that specifically had the welfare of railway employees in mind. During this period, between 150 and 300 railway staff were being killed – in a bad year!!!! The Railway Employment (Prevention of Accidents) Act of 1900 was passed, laying down some 50 different matters regarding safety of railwaymen, which had to be introduced by 1902 on all operating railways.

As a result of measures introduced with the force of law (legal/statutory requirements), the safety of passengers and railway employees slowly began to improve. It was to be many years before the UK Railway companies were able to show that no passengers had been killed and that there had been a substantial reduction in the numbers of railway employees and contractors killed in the performance of their duties. The appendix to this paper gives the figures from 1947 to 1999, ie, from the beginning of the post-WW2 nationalised railway to the present day.

 

Heritage Railways

In nearly 50 years of operation, since the opening of the Talyllyn Railway in 1951, there has only been one passenger death on a Heritage Railway. He would not have been killed if he had not been very inebriated, climbing out of the carriage window to sit on the roof of the carriage until he was struck by a low-flying bridge.

Why ? It is my belief that the practise of railway operation – in accordance with a Rule Book – by all 109 operating railways/steam centres/museums in the Heritage Railway Association has been a fundamental part of this quite out-standing record.

 

Rules again

Rules, and obedience to them, work when all parties to the operation know they can trust them. This knowledge can only be sustained by regular, independent testing of an individual’s knowledge of the Rules, combined with practical experience gained by implementing them in operating conditions. Bluntly, it is this ‘independent testing’ and the individual’s successful ‘passing out’ of their Rules exam, that is the foundation of the reliance by all others involved in operating the railway - that the individual "knows what he is doing".

The Rules – and adherence to them at all times – means that, in an emergency, people do not have to stop and think; the procedures provided by the Rules come into play and the appropriate actions are taken.

 

Conclusions

Passenger safety on railways has been bought at a heavy price. As we have seen from the examples quoted – and the long time intervals involved – some 100 years elapsed before the public could reasonably consider that travel by train was safe, let alone the railway employees being in a safe working environment.

Many of us at this conference work with locomotives and wagons that owe their existence to military demands. Astonishingly, WW1 saw huge surpluses of railway stock being sold into the civilian arena after the cessation of hostilities. Quarry operators, manufacturers, contractors and service industries all bought into this available resource. My own railway, the Leighton Buzzard, was probably the first in the World to make the change, in 1921, from steam locomotive haulage to internal combustion due entirely to the availability of ex-military supplies. Steam did not re-appear on the LBR until 1971 when it was partly operated by railway preservationists

In this journey down the main-line of railway history, we have seen that it was nearly 100 years before passengers and railway employees could begin to feel safe. It is experience that has been bought at a very expensive price. The purchase means that the public has a perception that ‘travelling on railways is safe.’

The interlacing of the influence of the military with railway operation and our involvement in the operation of so much ex-military material as well as the public’s perception referred to above, bring their own imperatives. Many, if not all of us, survive because we invite the public to pay for our enjoyment. To short-change them by ‘playing at trains’ is tantamount to a criminal offence. Operating Rules are the Code by which a railway has the potential to be a safe operation. Obedience to the Rules is the way in which that safe operation can be achieved.

 

Tony Tomkins - Vice President
Leighton Buzzard Railway
Environmental Adviser-Heritage Railway Association

July 2000

I am indebted to Major John Poyntz of Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate for advice and comment on the contents of this paper, however, the comments and opinions expressed are entirely those of the Author.

 

Appendix A

Table of deaths of passengers and railwaymen in train accidents (Great Britain)

1947 to 1998

 

Year

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

PASS

             

93

39

0

RLYM

             

8

14

6

 

Year

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

PASS

11

43

111

22

0

40

0

92

18

1

RLYM

8

4

9

7

1

8

3

4

5

8

 

Year

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

PASS

6

9

20

1

5

2

0

71

10

10

RLYM

6

10

2

12

9

5

3

5

8

9

 

Year

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

PASS

2

3

6

14

1

47

0

0

13

8

RLYM

7

7

3

3

4

7

8

3

3

8

 

Year

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

PASS

0

4

0

2

18

0

8

3

34

6

RLYM

4

1

8

1

6

0

5

1

2

6

 

Year

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

PASS

0

2

0

0

3

1

1

7

0

 

RLYM

1

2

1

0

5

1

0

0

0

 

 

Notes :

a) PASS = passengers RLYM = railwaymen

b) these figures do not include deaths by suicides or tresspass.

c) The figures for 1952 include 108 passengers and 4 railwaymen in the Harrow & Wealdstone accident 08/10/1952.

d) The figures for 1957 include 87 passengers and 1 railwayman in the St. Johns accident 04/12/1957.

 

APPEVA
BP 106, 80001 AMIENS CEDEX 1, FRANCE
Tél./Fax : (+33) 03 22 44 04 99
E-Mail : appeva@club-internet.fr